Climate change perceptions and their individual-level determinants: A cross-European analysis by Poortinga, Wouter et al.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/119423/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Poortinga, Wouter, Whitmarsh, Lorraine, Steg, Linda, Böhm, Gisela and Fisher, Stephen 2019.
Climate change perceptions and their individual-level determinants: a cross-European analysis.
Global Environmental Change 55 , pp. 25-35. 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.01.007 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.01.007
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.01.007>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
1 
 
Climate change perceptions and their individual-level 1 
determinants: A cross-European analysis 2 
Wouter Poortingaa b *, Lorraine Whitmarshb, Linda Stegc, and Gisela Böhmd e Stephen Fisherf,  3 
 4 
a Welsh School of Architecture, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales, United Kingdom. 5 
b School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales, United Kingdom. 6 
c Department of Psychology, Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of 7 
Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands. 8 
d Department of Psychosocial Science, Faculty of Psychology, University of Bergen, Bergen, 9 
Norway. 10 
e Department of Psychology, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Lillehammer, 11 
Norway. 12 
f Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom. 13 
*Corresponding Author. Welsh School of Architecture, Cardiff University. Bute Building, 14 
King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff, Wales, UK, CF10 3NB; Tel: +44(0)2920 874 755; fax: 15 
+44(0)2920 974 623 (PoortingaW@cardiff.ac.uk); twitter: @wouterpoortinga. 16 
Key words: climate change; perceptions; European Social Survey; cross-national analysis. 17 
 18 
Acknowledgments: The European Social Survey (ESS) is a European Research 19 
Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC). Participating countries contribute to the central 20 
coordination costs of the ESS ERIC as well as covering the costs of their own fieldwork and 21 
national coordination. 22 
 23 
 24 
  25 
2 
 
Abstract 26 
There is now an extensive literature on the question of how individual-level factors affect 27 
climate change perceptions, showing that socio-political variables, notably values, worldviews 28 
and political orientation, are key factors alongside demographic variables. Yet little is known 29 
about cross-national differences in these effects, as most studies have been conducted in a 30 
single or small number of countries and cross-study comparisons are difficult due to different 31 
conceptualisations of key climate change dimensions. Using data from the European Social 32 
Survey Round 8 (n = 44,387), we examine how key socio-political and demographic factors 33 
are associated with climate change perception across 22 European countries and Israel. We 34 
show that human values and political orientation are important predictors of climate change 35 
beliefs and concern, as are the demographics of gender, age, and education. Certain 36 
associations with climate change perceptions, such as the ones for the self-transcendence versus 37 
self-enhancement value dimension, political orientation, and education, are more consistent 38 
across countries than for gender and age. However, even if the direction of the associations are 39 
to a large extent consistent, the sizes of the effects are not. We demonstrate that the sizes of the 40 
effects are generally smaller in Central and Eastern European countries, and that some 41 
demographic effects are larger in Northern European as compared to Western European 42 
countries. This suggests that findings from one country do not always generalize to other 43 
national contexts. 44 
 45 
1. Introduction 46 
1.1 Background 47 
Public perceptions of climate change have been extensively studied over the past two 48 
to three decades (Capstick, Whitmarsh, Poortinga, Pidgeon, & Upham, 2015). This research is 49 
conducted on the understanding that climate change perceptions are critical to public 50 
engagement and support for action on climate change (Bord, O’Connor, & Fisher, 2000; 51 
Corner, Markowitz, & Pidgeon, 2014). Ambitious targets, such as set out in the Paris agreement 52 
(UNFCCC, 2017) and the European Commission’s 2030 energy strategy (European 53 
Commission, 2014), require fundamental shifts in the way energy is used and produced to 54 
mitigate climate change. However, policymakers may be reluctant to take meaningful action, 55 
if their electorate do not think that climate change is happening, anthropogenic, or a serious 56 
threat. 57 
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The now extensive literature on climate change perceptions has contributed to a better 58 
insight into how different individuals perceive and engage with climate change. Many studies 59 
on the topic have focused on individual-level factors in people’s beliefs and concerns about 60 
climate change. This research appears to show a consistent pattern across different 61 
demographic groups. In particular, the research shows that men, older age groups, and those 62 
with fewer years of formal education tend to be more doubtful about the reality and 63 
anthropogenic nature of climate change, reflecting trend and attribution scepticism, 64 
respectively (Milfont, Milojev, Greaves, & Sibley, 2015; Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, 65 
Capstick, & Pidgeon, 2011), and that they are less concerned about the impacts of climate 66 
change (Shi, Visschers, Siegrist, & Arvai, 2016; Whitmarsh, 2011). Explanations for this 67 
patterning include the ‘white male effect’, showing that Caucasian men are generally more 68 
accepting of a range of environmental and technological risks – with a pattern that is distinct 69 
from almost any other demographic group (Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, & Satterfield, 70 
2000). This may reflect societal inequalities, as well as differences in the subjective experience 71 
of vulnerability in relation to these risks (Satterfield, Mertz, & Slovic, 2004). The effects may 72 
however be contingent on the particular type of environmental risk concern (Hayes, 2001), and 73 
gender differences may not exist in relation to generic environmental concern (Echavarren, 74 
2017). Some scholars have pointed to the role of conservative values (the ‘conservative male 75 
effect’) in combination with identity-protective cognition (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic, & 76 
Mertz, 2007; McCright & Dunlap, 2013), whereby lower levels of risk perception, including 77 
those for climate change, indicate a motivation to maintain prevailing social structures (Jylhä 78 
& Akrami, 2015; Jylhä, Cantal, Akrami, & Milfont, 2016). Climate scepticism appears to be 79 
particularly common among politically conservative men in a number of countries (McCright 80 
& Dunlap, 2011; Milfont et al., 2015; Whitmarsh, 2011); and there is evidence that gender 81 
difference are only modest when key beliefs and values are taken into account (McCright, 82 
2010). 83 
Age effects in climate change perceptions have been found consistently across a large 84 
number of countries (e.g. Echavarren, 2017; McCright, 2010; Milfont et al., 2015; Poortinga 85 
et al., 2011). Age effects, just as gender effects, have been explained by differences in 86 
motivation to maintain prevailing social structures. Older people are more integrated into 87 
existing social orders, and therefore may have more to lose by changes that are needed to 88 
address environmental challenges such as climate change. Age differences may also be 89 
explained by climate change having been a threat and/or part of the formal education 90 
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(Stevenson et al., 2014) when older age cohorts were growing up. Furthermore, value 91 
orientations may change over the lifecourse, which may have implications for how one feels 92 
about climate change. There is evidence that people become more (politically) conservative as 93 
they age (Cornelis et al., 2009); and political values are among the strongest socio-political 94 
determinants of climate change perceptions (see below) 95 
Education effects, i.e. of people with longer formal education expressing higher levels 96 
of concern about the environment in general and climate change in particular (Marquart‐Pyatt, 97 
2008; O’Connor, Bord, & Fisher, 1999), are interpreted in multiple ways. It is often implicitly 98 
assumed that education is a proxy for knowledge or a better understanding of the scientific 99 
underpinnings of climate change. However, climate change and/or scientific knowledge itself 100 
tends to be a poor predictor of climate change beliefs (Whitmarsh, 2011), with climate sceptics 101 
being generally as knowledgeable as non-sceptics (Hornsey, Harris, Bain, & Fielding, 2016). 102 
Knowledge may even have diverging effects depending on people’s political orientation 103 
(Kahan et al., 2012; Lee, Markowitz, Howe, Ko, & Leiserowitz, 2015; Malka, Krosnick, & 104 
Langer, 2009), suggesting that a lack of belief or concern about climate change may not be due 105 
to a deficit in knowledge (Snow & Dibners, 2016). Socio-economic effects are further 106 
interpreted in reference to post-materialism theory (Inglehart, 1990). Individuals who have 107 
satisfied their basic material needs may shift their attention to more postmaterialist ones, such 108 
as freedom, quality of life and environmental protection (Fransson & Garling, 1999; Knight, 109 
2016). While, overall, there are clear indications that the demographics of gender, age, and 110 
education are all important factors in climate change perceptions, it is not known whether these 111 
effects are universal or that they vary across countries. 112 
Strong associations of climate change perceptions have also been found with a range of 113 
socio-political variables, such as political orientation, human values and worldviews (Hornsey 114 
et al., 2016). It is well established that public views on climate change are divided along party-115 
political lines in the US (Hoffman, 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; McCright, Dunlap, & 116 
Xiao, 2014); and there are indications that political orientation may be an important factor in 117 
other countries as well, in particular in Anglophone countries (Fielding, Head, Laffan, Western, 118 
& Hoegh-Guldberg, 2012; Milfont et al., 2015; Poortinga et al., 2011). It is however not clear 119 
whether possible political divides in other countries are as pronounced as in the US.  120 
The role of human values and cultural worldviews in climate change perceptions has 121 
also attracted widespread attention (Brown & Kasser, 2005; Corner et al., 2014; Kahan, 122 
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Jenkins‐Smith, & Braman, 2011; Poortinga, Steg, & Vlek, 2004). Values are understood as 123 
guiding principles in life, and are considered an important part of what forms our beliefs and 124 
attitudes towards social issues, including climate change (Milfont et al., 2015). This helps to 125 
shape the way we behave in relation to the environment (De Groot & Steg, 2008; Poortinga et 126 
al., 2004; Stern, 2000). Values’ associations with climate-relevant attitudes and behaviour have 127 
mostly been studied using either Schwartz’ theory of basic human values, which arranges ten 128 
distinct clusters across the two axes of conservation versus openness-to-change and self-129 
transcendence versus self-enhancement (Schwartz, 1992), or the altruistic, egoistic, and 130 
biospheric trio of values derived from the Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) model (Dietz, Dan, & 131 
Shwom, 2007; Stern, 2000). Research has consistently shown that people who endorse self-132 
transcending (or: altruistic) values have higher levels of concern and are less likely to be 133 
sceptical about anthropogenic climate change (Brown & Kasser, 2005; Corner et al., 2014; De 134 
Groot & Steg, 2007; Poortinga et al., 2004), while the opposite is generally (if not always) true 135 
for self-enhancement (or: egoistic) values (Steg & De Groot, 2012). While multiple studies 136 
have focused on the self-transcendence and self-enhancement value dimension, the role of the 137 
conservation and openness-to-change value dimensions in climate change perceptions has been 138 
explored less. There are indications that individuals who hold openness-to-change values have 139 
stronger beliefs in the reality of climate change and its human cause (Milfont et al., 2015), and 140 
that those endorsing conservation values are less likely to be concerned about or willing to 141 
make changes for the environment (Schultz & Zelezny, 1999; Stern, Dietz, & Guagnano, 142 
1998). Overall, the effects for openness-to-change and conservation values appear weaker than 143 
for self-transcendence and self-enhancement values, and a few studies found non-significant 144 
relationships with these dimensions (Milfont et al., 2015; Poortinga et al., 2004; Steg & De 145 
Groot, 2012). 146 
The question remains whether these findings can be generalised to different countries 147 
or cultural contexts. Notably, most studies that have examined individual-level factors in 148 
relation to climate change perceptions have been conducted in a single or a small number of 149 
countries; and it is difficult to compare studies due to the use of different measures and 150 
conceptualisations of key climate change dimensions. A recent meta-analysis showed that 151 
individual-level effects were significantly moderated by the type of measure used (Hornsey et 152 
al., 2016). There are indications that the importance of different demographic and socio-153 
political values in predicting climate change perceptions may vary cross-nationally 154 
independent of the type of measure. For example, Shi and colleagues found that gender, age 155 
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and education do not predict concern about climate change to the same extent in six different 156 
countries (Shi et al., 2016). Similarly, political ideology has been shown to predicts climate 157 
change beliefs in certain countries but not in others (Capstick et al., 2015). Whereas McCright 158 
and colleagues (2016) found that political ideology is associated with public views on climate 159 
change across multiple Western European countries, the effects are not as pronounced as in the 160 
US. Furthermore, non-significant effects were found for political affiliation in former 161 
communist countries (McCright, Dunlap, & Marquart-Pyatt, 2016). There are suggestions that 162 
climate scepticism in the media is predominantly an Anglophone phenomenon (Painter & 163 
Ashe, 2012), and it can be expected that polarisation is the greatest in countries where there is 164 
a political home for climate sceptical views through continued media attention and political 165 
representation (Dunlap & McCright, 2011; Engels, Hüther, Schäfer, & Held, 2013; Milfont et 166 
al., 2015; Poortinga et al., 2011; Tranter & Booth, 2015). 167 
Marquart-Pyatt (2008) concluded that the individual-level sources for environmental 168 
concern, including demographics and knowledge, are largely consistent across nineteen 169 
industrialised countries; although there were some differences between them. In particular, a 170 
number of coefficients appeared different in former communist countries as compared to 171 
advanced industrialised countries (Marquart‐Pyatt, 2008). The study focused on environmental 172 
concern, which may be less politicised than attitudes to climate change. A recent meta-analysis 173 
found high levels of variation in the strength of individual-level effects across studies (Hornsey 174 
et al., 2016), and particularly revealed significant differences in effect sizes between US and 175 
non-US samples. Yet, they did not explicitly examine cross-country variation. Moreover, the 176 
studies that were included in the meta-analysis were sourced from a large number of countries, 177 
and used data from diverse representative and non-representative samples that were collected 178 
at different time periods, making it difficult to draw firm conclusions about possible country 179 
differences. Furthermore, the studies included a wide variety of measures reflecting different 180 
aspects of climate change perceptions. It is therefore possible that the reported variation in 181 
individual-level effects is attributable to methodological (e.g. specific outcome measure or 182 
sampling strategy used) or contextual (e.g. country and period in which study was conducted) 183 
differences between the different studies. There is thus a clear need for systematic international 184 
comparisons to better understand the importance of individual factors for climate change 185 
perceptions in different national contexts (Hopkins, 2015). 186 
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1.2 Aims of this Paper 187 
In this paper we make use of the European Social Survey Round 8 (European Social 188 
Survey, 2016) to examine how individual-level demographic and socio-political factors are 189 
linked to climate change perceptions. In particular, we will examine levels of climate change 190 
perceptions and their determinants in 22 European countries and Israel. The focus of the paper 191 
is on four dimensions of climate change perceptions: public beliefs about the existence, causes, 192 
and consequences of climate change, and climate change concern. We distinguish between 193 
climate change beliefs, defined as propositional cognitions about the nature of climate change 194 
that may or may not correspond with reality (i.e. beliefs regarding the reality, causes, and 195 
impacts of climate change, which are often used to identify trend, attribution, and impact 196 
sceptical views; Poortinga et al., 2011), and climate concern, defined as affective evaluations 197 
of the seriousness of (the impacts of) climate change, indicated by personal feelings of worry 198 
about the issue (cf. Lo & Chow, 2015). We collectively refer to climate change beliefs and 199 
concern as climate change perceptions. 200 
The paper has four aims. First, it will examine national differences in climate change 201 
perceptions across the 23 countries. Second, it will explore associations of different individual-202 
level socio-political and demographic predictors with climate change perceptions across all 203 
countries. Third, it will assess cross-national differences in the strength of the relationships 204 
between these individual-level predictors and climate change perceptions, that is, whether the 205 
sizes of the regression coefficients of individual-level socio-political and demographic 206 
predictors differ between countries. Fourth, the paper will explore whether there are systematic 207 
differences in individual-level effects between different European regions, namely Western, 208 
Central and Eastern, Southern, and Northern European countries. By using high-quality, 209 
standardised measures of the key variables of interest, and coordinated data collection 210 
according to the highest methodological standards, the study is able to exclude methodological 211 
sources of variation. 212 
2. Methods 213 
2.1 The European Social Survey 214 
The European Social Survey (ESS) is a biennial pan-European survey that has been 215 
conducted since 2002. Each round contains two modules on key social themes. Round 8 of the 216 
ESS (European Social Survey, 2016) included a module on Climate and Energy, designed by 217 
the authors together with ESS headquarters and national coordinating teams. The ESS has a 218 
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number of methodological standards regarding questionnaire design, translation and data 219 
collection. The questionnaire was developed in English through a two-year design process, 220 
which included extensive testing, piloting and translation by national teams (European Social 221 
Survey, 2015; Fitzgerald, 2015). Each country needed to achieve a minimum effective sample 222 
size of 1,500 (or 800 in countries with populations smaller than 2 million), representative of 223 
the resident population. Data collection involved strict random probability sampling to obtain 224 
nationally-representative samples, and an extensive concept-based design process to ensure 225 
measurement equivalence (Fitzgerald & Jowell, 2010). Interviews were conducted face-to-face 226 
in respondents’ own homes with people aged 15 years and over. The sample sizes for the 23 227 
countries are provided in Table 1. In total, 44,387 participants were available for the analyses. 228 
Data were collected, usually within three-month, in the period from August 2016 to December 229 
2017. Post-stratification weight were used to take account of unequal probabilities of selection, 230 
as well as of sampling and non-response error. The full questionnaire and the complete 231 
European Social Survey Round 8 dataset can be downloaded from 232 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 233 
2.2 Measures 234 
2.2.1 Dependent variables (climate change perceptions) 235 
Climate change beliefs. Three questions were asked to assess people’s beliefs regarding the 236 
existence, causes, and consequences of climate change, respectively. Trend scepticism was 237 
determined by asking respondents “You may have heard the idea that the world’s climate is 238 
changing due to increases in temperature over the past 100 years. What is your personal opinion 239 
on this? Do you think the world’s climate is changing?” Respondents could use the options: 240 
definitely not changing, probably not changing, probably changing, and definitely changing. 241 
The 4-point response scale was dichotomised to 0 (probably/definitely changing) and 1 242 
(probably/definitely not changing). Attribution scepticism was assessed with the question “Do 243 
you think that climate change is caused by natural processes, human activity, or both?” The 244 
responses were coded as 1 (entirely/mainly by natural processes) and 0 (entirely/mainly by 245 
human activity/about equally by natural processes and human activity). The non-prompted 246 
option of “I don’t think climate change is happening” was coded as missing to avoid overlap 247 
with trend sceptical beliefs. Perceived impacts of climate change: respondents were asked to 248 
indicate how good or bad they thought the impact of climate change would be on people across 249 
the world, on a scale from -5 (extremely bad) and +5 (extremely good).  250 
9 
 
Climate concern was assessed by asking respondents “How worried are you about climate 251 
change?” with the response options of 1 (not at all worried), 2 (not very worried), 3 (somewhat 252 
worried), 4 (very worried), and 5 (extremely worried). 253 
2.2.2. Independent variables (socio-political and demographic variables) 254 
Human values. A modified 21-item version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) was 255 
used to measure peoples’ values (Schwartz, 2003). Each item consists of a short two-sentence, 256 
gender-matched description of a person. Respondents then indicate on a 6-point scale from 1 257 
(very much like me) to 6 (not like me at all) how similar this person is to themselves. The 258 
Schwartz (2015) approach was used to transform the items into 10 values. Universalism, 259 
Benevolence, Achievement (reversed) and Power (reversed) values were subsequently 260 
combined into an internally consistent Self-transcendence vs. Self-enhancement dimension 261 
(α=0.65), and Conformity, Security, Stimulation (reversed) and Hedonism (reversed) values 262 
into an internally consistent Conservation vs. Openness-to-change dimension (α=0.67). Higher 263 
positive values correspond to more self-transcendence and more openness-to-change values, 264 
relative to self enhancement and openness-to-change respectively. The two value scales were 265 
standardised by calculating the Z scores across all countries. 266 
Political orientation involved self-placement on a 10-point scale ranging from 0 (left) to 10 267 
(right). The question read: “In politics people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Using this 268 
card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the 269 
right?” The political orientation variable was standardised by calculating Z scores across all 270 
countries. 271 
Demographics. Gender was indicated as 0 (female) and 1 (male). The age variable was centred 272 
on its grand mean of 47.64, and expressed in 10 year deviations from that mean. Level of 273 
education was indicated by the ESS version of the International Standard Classification of 274 
Education (ISCED). The level of education variable was centred on its grand mean of 4.14. 275 
European regions. The European Regions included Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, 276 
Switzerland, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands), Central and 277 
Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, the Russian Federation, 278 
and Slovenia), Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, and Portugal), and Northern Europe (Finland, 279 
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden). This distinction was made, as previous research has 280 
predominantly been conducted in Western and Northern European countries, and there are 281 
indications that differences in climate change perceptions across different socio-political and 282 
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demographic groups are smaller in former communist Central and Eastern European countries 283 
(Marquart-Pyatt, 2012; McCright, Dunlap, & Marquart-Pyatt, 2016). Israel was excluded from 284 
the region comparisons as the only non-European country involved in the ESS (Israel was 285 
included in all the other analyses). 286 
2.3. Data analysis 287 
Multilevel modelling was used to analyse the data, utilising the MLwiN 2.36 software 288 
package, with individuals (level 1) nested within countries (level 2). Logistic models were 289 
constructed for trend and attribution scepticism, and linear models for the perceived impacts of 290 
climate change and concern about climate change. Three sets of analyses were conducted, in 291 
addition to the descriptive statistics to assess national differences in climate change 292 
perceptions. First, we constructed a series of random intercept multilevel regression models 293 
that included human values, political orientation, and demographics of gender, age, and level 294 
of education as predictors (Model 1). Only the fixed effects of the multilevel regression models 295 
are reported. Hence, these models were used to estimate the overall associations of the 296 
independent variables with the four climate change perception dimensions across the 23 297 
countries, while allowing the countries to vary with respect to their average level on the 298 
dependent variable in the respective regression model. Second, a series of random intercept, 299 
random slope models were constructed for the four dependent climate change belief and 300 
concern variables. This means that Model 1 was extended by allowing the slopes of the 301 
independent variables to vary across countries (Model 2). Separate regression analyses were 302 
conducted for each of the six independent variables in their associations with the four climate 303 
change perception dimensions. That is, all independent variables were included, but only one 304 
slope was allowed to vary in each regression model. This approach was chosen, as the number 305 
of countries involved is insufficient to reliably estimate all parameters simultaneously. Only 306 
the random effects of the multilevel regression analyses are reported. The random effects 307 
indicate the cross-country variation in the strength of the association between the individual-308 
level socio-political and demographic variables on the one hand and the climate change belief 309 
and concern variables on the other. Third, a series of analyses was conducted to examine 310 
whether there are any systematic differences between countries from different European 311 
regions. This was done by adding the regions as dummy variables (Model 3a), and 312 
subsequently their interactions with the socio-political and demographic variables (Model 3b). 313 
Separate regression analyses were conducted for each of the six independent variables in their 314 
associations with the four climate change perception dimensions. This means that each 315 
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multilevel regression model had three dummies indicating Central and Eastern European, 316 
Southern European, and Northern European countries, respectively (using Western European 317 
countries as the reference category), and three interaction terms of Central and Eastern 318 
European, Southern, and Northern European countries with the respective socio-political and 319 
demographic factors. Only the interaction effects are reported. The interaction effects indicate 320 
the extent to which the individual-level effects in those regions differ from the ones found in 321 
the Western European countries. 322 
3. Results 323 
3.1 National differences in climate change perceptions  324 
In line with several other studies (e.g. Capstick et al., 2015), we find that levels of trend 325 
and attribution scepticism are low in most countries (see Table 1). This means that an 326 
overwhelming majority of the European population thinks that climate change is happening 327 
and is at least partly caused by human activity. However, there are substantial differences across 328 
the participating countries. Trend scepticism ranged from 2.3% in Iceland to 16.5% in the 329 
Russian Federation, and attribution scepticism from 4.0% in Spain to 15.4% in Lithuania. 330 
Attribution scepticism in Norway (12.0%) was surprisingly high, given that it has a middle-331 
sized level of trend scepticism (7.1%) and a just-above average level of concern about climate 332 
change (see below). On average, the perceived impacts of climate change were seen to be 333 
negative in all participating countries, and ranged from -1.07 in Israel to -2.55 in Portugal, 334 
suggesting that most people think that the impacts of climate change around Europe (and Israel) 335 
will only be slightly negative. Average levels of concern ranged from 2.64 in Israel and 2.65 336 
in Estonia to 3.42 in Spain and 3.48 in Portugal. This means that in all countries concern 337 
hovered around the scale midpoint of 3, which equates to “somewhat worried”. These differing 338 
results show the importance of distinguishing between different types of climate change beliefs 339 
and concern.  340 
3.2 Individual-level effects of climate change perceptions 341 
We subsequently explored the associations of the individual-level socio-political and 342 
demographic factors with the four climate change perception dimensions across the 23 343 
countries. This was done with a series of random intercept multilevel models, in which the 344 
individual-level factors were included as independent variables (Model 1). The models 345 
assumed the regression coefficients to be constant but allowed the intercepts to vary across the 346 
participating countries. This type of analysis allows us to explore the overall associations, while 347 
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taking into consideration that the countries differ with respect to their means. As can be seen 348 
in Table 2, the six socio-political and demographic variables were significant predictors of a 349 
number or all climate perception dimensions. Individuals who prioritise self-transcendence 350 
over self-enhancing values were less likely to have trend or attribution sceptical views (as is 351 
indicated by odds ratios below 1), perceived the impacts of climate change to be more negative, 352 
and had higher levels of concern. The conservation vs openness-to-change value dimension 353 
was non-significantly associated with trend and attribution scepticism, but individuals 354 
prioritising conservation over openness-to-change values tended to perceive the impacts of 355 
climate change as slightly less negative and to have slightly lower levels of concern. Individuals 356 
who placed themselves on the right hand side of the political spectrum were more likely to 357 
have trend or attribution sceptical views, perceived the impacts of climate change to be less 358 
negative, and had lower levels of concern.  359 
The results demonstrate that men were more likely to have trend and attribution 360 
sceptical beliefs across the 23 countries, and generally had lower levels of concern about 361 
climate change than women. In contrast to these findings, men perceived the impacts of climate 362 
change to be more negative than women did. Furthermore, older respondents were more likely 363 
to have trend or attribution sceptical views, perceived the impacts of climate change to be less 364 
negative, and had lower levels of concern about climate change than younger respondents. 365 
Finally, the results show that level of education was negatively associated with trend and 366 
attribution sceptical beliefs. Respondents with higher levels of education also perceived the 367 
impacts of climate change to be more negative, and had higher levels of concern about climate 368 
change.  369 
3.3. Cross-national differences in the strength of effects 370 
In order to investigate cross-national variation in the strength of individual-level effects, 371 
we conducted a series of random intercept, random slope multilevel regression analyses, in 372 
which not only the intercepts but also slopes of the regression coefficients were allowed to vary 373 
across countries (Model 2). Table 3 presents the cross-country variation (σ²) in the strength of 374 
the associations between the individual-level socio-political and demographic variables on the 375 
one hand and the climate change perception dimensions on the other. It shows that the cross-376 
country variation in the associations of the self-transcendence vs self-enhancement value 377 
dimension with trend scepticism, attribution scepticism and the perceived impacts of climate 378 
change were significant, but not with concern about climate change. All of the associations of 379 
the conservation vs. openness-to-change value dimension varied significantly across the 23 380 
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countries. For political orientation, the cross-country variation in the associations with 381 
attribution scepticism, perceived impacts of climate change and concern about climate change 382 
were significant, but not the one with trend scepticism. The associations of gender with 383 
attribution scepticism concern about climate change varied significantly across the 23 384 
countries, as did the association of gender with concern about climate change. The associations 385 
of age with trend scepticism, attribution scepticism and the perceived impacts of climate 386 
change were significant, but not the one with concern about climate change. Similarly, the 387 
associations of education with trend scepticism, attribution scepticism and the perceived 388 
impacts of climate change were significant, but not the one with concern about climate change.  389 
Figures 1 and 2 show the country-level regression lines for the socio-political and 390 
demographic variables, respectively. The figures visualise the degree to which the associations 391 
vary across the 23 countries. The raw regression coefficients and their confidence intervals are 392 
provided in the Supplementary Information document (see Tables A to F) to show the strength 393 
of the associations in the individual countries. The figures appear to show that certain 394 
associations are more consistent across countries than others, and that the cross-national 395 
variations in the strength of individual-level effects sometimes but not always lead to different 396 
conclusions regarding their importance. Table A in the supporting information shows that the 397 
self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement value dimension is consistently and positively 398 
associated with concern about climate change. It is also consistently associated with the 399 
perceived negative impacts of climate change, with only a few exceptions. While the self-400 
transcendence vs. self-enhancement value dimension was generally negatively associated with 401 
trend and attribution scepticism, the associations were non-significant in twelve and five 402 
countries, respectively (Table A). 403 
With regard to the conservation vs. openness-to-change value dimension, this factor 404 
was non-significantly associated with trend and attribution scepticism in the overwhelming 405 
majority of countries (Table B). It was only significantly associated with trend scepticism in 406 
the Czech Republic and with attribution scepticism in Israel. However, while the overall 407 
association of the factor with the perceived impacts of climate change was non-significant 408 
(Table 2), there were a number of countries in which the association was significantly negative 409 
and a number of countries where the association was significantly positive. Furthermore, 410 
whereas the overall association of the conservation vs. openness-to-change value dimension 411 
with concern about climate change was found to be significantly negative, the associations 412 
were non-significant in a majority of the individual countries, with only a few exceptions. 413 
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The associations of political orientation with the four climate perception dimensions 414 
were consistent across the 23 countries (Table C). Individuals with a right-leaning political 415 
orientation were less likely to perceive negative impacts and to be concerned about climate 416 
change in a majority of countries. While a right-leaning political orientation was generally 417 
positively associated with trend and attribution scepticism, the associations were non-418 
significant in seven and nine countries, respectively.  419 
The association of gender with trend scepticism was generally consistent across the 23 420 
countries (Table D). The association was non-significant in five countries. The associations of 421 
gender with the other three climate perception dimensions were less consistent. While gender 422 
was positively associated with attribution scepticism overall (Table 2), the association was non-423 
significant in ten out of the 23 countries. Similarly, while gender was negatively associated 424 
with concern about climate change overall, the association was non-significant in twelve out 425 
of the 23 countries. While men were found to perceive less negative impacts overall, the 426 
associations of gender with the perceived impacts of climate change were non-significant in all 427 
but two countries. 428 
Age was consistently associated with attribution scepticism: in virtually all countries 429 
older respondents were more likely to have doubts about the anthropogenic nature of climate 430 
change (Table E). However, its association with the other three climate perceptions dimensions 431 
was more variable. In a majority of countries, older respondents were more likely to hold trend 432 
sceptical views, to perceive less negative impacts, and to be less concerned about climate 433 
change; but the associations were non-significant in ten countries for each of the three 434 
dimensions. The association between age and concern was even significantly positive in 435 
Lithuania. 436 
Respondents with a higher level of education were generally less likely to hold trend 437 
and attribution sceptical beliefs, perceived more negative impacts, and were more concerned 438 
about climate change (Table F). These effects were consistent, in particular for attribution 439 
scepticism and concern about climate change. The associations were non-significant in four 440 
and three countries respectively. The results for trend scepticism and the perceived impacts of 441 
climate change were somewhat more variable. The associations were non-significant in nine 442 
and eight countries, respectively. 443 
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3.4 Differences in the strength of effects between European regions 444 
We subsequently conducted a series of analyses to examine whether there are any 445 
systematic differences between countries in different European regions. Table 4 presents the 446 
main (Model 3a) the interaction effects (Model 3b) of Central and Eastern, Southern, and 447 
Northern European countries that took part in the ESS. It shows that trend (OR=2.05, 95%CI 448 
1.26 to 3.25) and attribution (OR=1.56, 95%CI 1.06 to 2.29) scepticism are more common in 449 
Central and Eastern Europe as compared to Western Europe; that the perceived impacts are 450 
more negative and that concern about climate change is higher in Southern Europe; and that 451 
there are no significant differences between Northern and Western Europe in any of the four 452 
climate perception dimensions.  453 
The interaction effects (Model 3b) indicate the extent to which the individual-level 454 
effects in Central and Eastern, Southern and Northern European countries differ from the ones 455 
found in Western European countries. The interaction effects need to be compared to the 456 
regression coefficients of the different factors (see Table 4), which reflect their association with 457 
the respective climate perception dimensions in Western European countries. That is, where 458 
the overall regression coefficient is positive, a negative interaction term generally indicates a 459 
weaker effect and a positive interaction term a stronger effect for that factor in the region of 460 
interest. Reversely, where the overall regression coefficient is negative, a negative interaction 461 
term generally indicates a stronger effect and a positive interaction term a weaker effect. Where 462 
the overall regression coefficient is close to zero (e.g. for conservation vs openness-to-change), 463 
a negative interaction term may indicate a negative effect and a positive interaction term a 464 
positive effect for that factor in the region of interest. 465 
Table 4 shows that the effects of the self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement value 466 
dimension were generally weaker in Central and Eastern European countries than in Western 467 
European countries, as indicated by the positive interaction terms for attribution scepticism and 468 
perceived impacts of climate change, and the negative interaction term for concern about 469 
climate change. The effects of self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement values were also 470 
weaker in Northern European countries as compared to Western European countries, although 471 
the interaction effects for attribution scepticism and concern about climate change were non-472 
significant. No significant differences were found between Southern and Western Europe. 473 
Individuals living in Southern European countries, who prioritise conservation over 474 
openness-to-change values, were more likely to hold attribution sceptical views and to perceive 475 
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less negative climate change impacts, as indicated by positive interaction terms. Individuals 476 
living in Northern European countries, who prioritise conservation over openness-to-change 477 
values, were more likely to hold trend and attribution sceptical views and to perceive less 478 
negative climate change impacts, as indicated by positive interaction terms. This is in contrast 479 
to Western Europe where the associations were non-significant. The only significant 480 
interaction of Central and Eastern Europe with the conservation vs. openness-to-change value 481 
dimension was found for the perceived impacts of climate change. The negative interaction 482 
term indicates that, on average, conservation vs. openness-to-change values are associated with 483 
more negative perceived climate change impacts in Eastern European countries.  484 
The political orientation effects were generally weaker in Central and Eastern European 485 
countries as compared to Western European countries, as indicated by the negative interaction 486 
terms for trend scepticism and the perceived impacts of climate change, and by the negative 487 
interaction term for concern about climate change. In Southern Europe, political orientation 488 
effects were weaker for the perceived impacts and concern about climate change, as indicated 489 
by a positive and a negative interaction term, respectively. The only significant interaction 490 
effect of Northern Europe with political orientation was for attribution scepticism. This 491 
suggests that there is a bigger political divide with regard to attribution scepticism in Northern 492 
European countries as compared to Western European countries.  493 
Table 4 further shows that there were only a small number of significant interaction 494 
effects for gender, suggesting that effects are relatively uniform across the different regions of 495 
Europe. In Central and Eastern and Northern European countries men were generally less 496 
concerned about climate change as compared to women in these regions, while the association 497 
of gender and climate concern was non-significant in Western European countries. The gender 498 
effects in relation to the perceived impacts of climate change were weaker in Central and 499 
Eastern European countries as compared to Western European countries. Gender effects were 500 
stronger in terms of attribution scepticism In Northern European countries as compared to 501 
Western European countries.The other interaction effects for gender were non-significant. 502 
Age effects were generally weaker in Eastern European countries than in Western 503 
European countries, as indicated by negative interaction terms for trend scepticism, attribution 504 
scepticism and perceived impacts of climate change, and a positive interaction term for concern 505 
about climate change. Age effects for the perceived impacts and concern about climate change 506 
were generally stronger in Northern European countries, as indicated by a positive and a 507 
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negative interaction term, respectively. The only significant interaction for Southern Europe 508 
was found for the perceived impacts of climate change, indicating that, on average, the age 509 
effects for the perceived impacts of climate change were weaker in Southern European 510 
countries as compared to Western European countries. 511 
The relationships between level of education on the one hand and the perceived impacts 512 
of climate change on the other appear stronger in Northern European countries, but weaker in 513 
Central and Eastern and Southern European countries (as indicated by negative and positive 514 
interactions, respectively). The link between education and attribution scepticism appears 515 
weaker in Eastern European countries as compared to Western European countries (as 516 
indicated by a positive interaction), while the link between education and trend scepticism 517 
appears stronger in Northern European as compared to Western European countries. The other 518 
interaction effects were non-significant. 519 
4. Discussion 520 
This paper examined the associations of climate change perceptions with a range of 521 
individual-level factors, and how the importance of these factors may vary cross-nationally. 522 
Building upon previous research on the individual-level determinants of climate change 523 
perceptions, we show that both socio-political and demographic factors are significant 524 
predictors of climate change beliefs and concern across 22 European countries and Israel 525 
(Capstick et al., 2015; Poortinga et al., 2011; Shi et al., 2016; Steentjes et al., 2017). This 526 
demonstrates that both socio-political and demographic factors are needed to understand public 527 
perceptions of climate change. 528 
We show that some of the associations are remarkably consistent across the 23 countries 529 
that participated in the European Social Survey (cf. Marquart-Pyatt, 2008). In particular 530 
political orientation, level of education and the self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement values 531 
dimensions, were consistently linked to four different dimensions of climate change 532 
perceptions. That is, people who place themselves on the right-hand side of the political 533 
spectrum, have a lower level of education, and prioritise self-enhancement over self-534 
transcendence values are more likely to hold climate sceptical views, perceive fewer negative 535 
impacts, and are less likely to be concerned about climate change in all or a great majority of 536 
countries. The other individual-level effects were more variable. For example, gender and age 537 
were significantly associated with climate change perceptions in some but non-significantly so 538 
in other countries; and whereas the conservation vs openness-to-change values dimension was 539 
18 
 
non-significantly associated with the four climate perception dimensions in most countries, 540 
there were a number of countries in which the association was significantly negative and a 541 
number of countries in which the association was significantly positive. Another interesting 542 
case is the association of gender with the perceived impacts of climate change. While the 543 
association is significant overall, it is only so in a small minority of individual countries 544 
(associations are non-significant in the other countries). 545 
Even if the direction of the associations were to a large extent consistent, the sizes of 546 
the effects were not. This shows the importance of cross-cultural research, and the need to 547 
validate results in multiple countries and cultural contexts before assuming certain effects are 548 
universal. For example, while climate change perceptions are fairly consistently linked to 549 
political orientation, they are not equally polarised in every country. This not only applies to 550 
the socio-political factors but also to the demographic ones. Evidence was found that the effects 551 
for the demographic (e.g. age) and socio-political (e.g. political orientation) factors are 552 
generally weaker in Eastern as compared to Western European countries. Some of the 553 
demographic effects (e.g. gender and age) appeared stronger in Northern European countries. 554 
Demographics can reflect important socio-cultural categories, as illustrated by the 555 
‘conservative male effect’ (cf. Jylhä & Akrami, 2015). The phenomenon that a specific 556 
demographic subgroup holds very distinct attitudes to a range of risk issues, from climate 557 
change and gun control to financial markets, emerged from and has mainly been found in the 558 
US (Dunlap & McCright, 2011; Finucane et al., 2000); and these socio-cultural categories may 559 
mean different things in different countries. That is, a conservative male in the US may socio-560 
culturally not be the same as a conservative male in a different country. 561 
The question of course is where the cross-national differences come from, and how they 562 
can be explained. The results of our study appear to confirm previous research showing 563 
systematic differences in individual-level effects between Central and Eastern European on the 564 
one hand and other European countries (McCright et al., 2016) and advanced industrialised 565 
countries (Marquart‐Pyatt, 2008) on the other. Specifically, there appears to be less of a 566 
political divide in former communist countries. Several explanations have been offered for an 567 
East-West divide in environmental attitudes. These mostly focus on the legacy left by decades 568 
of communist rule as well as the profound impact of its collapse in the late 1980s. For example, 569 
it has been argued that the political and economic uncertainty following the collapse of 570 
communist regimes may have prioritised economic survival over environmental protection (cf. 571 
Inglehart, 1990). Others point to the speed of economic and social change, and a possibility of 572 
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a cultural lag in environmental attitudes (Brinkman & Brinkman, 1997; Balžekiene & 573 
Telešiene, 2017). Environmental attitudes may be ‘sticky’, in particular when they emerge from 574 
fundamental orientations and beliefs (Chaisty & Whitefield, 2015). This means that they may 575 
have to play catch-up in a fast changing world. 576 
General explanations for cross-national differences include differences in experiences 577 
with extreme weather events (e.g. flooding and droughts) and vulnerability to the impacts of 578 
climate change (Brody, Zahran, Vedlitz, & Grover, 2008; Demski, Capstick, Pidgeon, Sposato, 579 
& Spence, 2017; Deryugina, 2013; Donner & McDaniels, 2013; Spence, Poortinga, Butler, & 580 
Pidgeon, 2011), elite cues and media coverage (Carmichael & Brulle, 2017; Feldman, Hart, 581 
Leiserowitz, Maibach, & Roser-Renouf, 2017), and current CO2 emissions and dependence on 582 
fossil fuels (Lee et al., 2015). While there are indications that all these factors are important for 583 
climate-relevant environmental attitudes, they are less appropriate for explaining differences 584 
in the size of individual-level effects. Here again we may need to look at possible historical 585 
and political explanations. According to Rohrschneider and colleagues (2015), one reason as 586 
to why left-right divisions are smaller in Central and Eastern Europe is because the 587 
environment is less of an issue for party competition in these countries. If political parties do 588 
not compete for the green vote, they are less likely to polarise the public in return (ibid). 589 
Furthermore, if there is no platform for climate sceptical views, either as part of party politics 590 
and/or the media, there is less opportunity for the public to become polarised through elite cues 591 
(cf. Brulle et al., 2016; Carmichael & Brulle, 2017) 592 
It is less clear as to why some of the demographic and value effects vary across 593 
countries and regions; and there is no coherent literature available to draw upon. Gender 594 
differences in environmental risk perception are often explained by social inequalities, and it 595 
could be argued that such effects are therefore less likely to emerge in more gender equal 596 
societies (Norgaard & York, 2005). This view is however not supported by the results of the 597 
current study. Gender effects appeared stronger in Northern European countries that tend to 598 
have higher levels of gender equality. Further research is needed to see wat may explain the 599 
effects. 600 
There is a need to be cautious when interpreting the reported findings. The study 601 
involved a relatively small number of countries (n=23). This means that the models only have 602 
the statistical power to detect large national-level differences (Button et al., 2013). One 603 
criticism of current climate perception research is that the vast majority of empirical focus has 604 
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been on a small number of mainly affluent Western countries (Hopkins, 2015). A strength of 605 
our study is that there was a range of countries, including a number of Eastern European 606 
countries with smaller and mainly national literatures on climate change perceptions (Gwiazda 607 
& Kolbowska, 2009; Balžekienė et al., 2008; Vladyka, 2007; Soasepp, 2016). The inclusion of 608 
these, as well as other countries across the continent, allowed for systematic comparisons 609 
between countries from different European regions.  610 
Most research on cross-national differences has predominantly been conducted using 611 
data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Values Survey 612 
WVS), which contained question modules on more generic environmental attitudes and 613 
preferences for environmental protection. While others used Eurobarometer or international 614 
opinion poll data, Round 8 of the ESS was the first international survey with a dedicated and 615 
theory-driven module on climate change perceptions, allowing this study to explore 616 
associations with different aspects of climate change perceptions in a systematic way. Climate 617 
change perceptions can be understood to have different dimensions, and thus may be influenced 618 
by different sets of determinants. Results relating to cross-national variation may also depend 619 
on the specific combination of countries included in the analysis (Lo & Chow, 2015). The 620 
countries included in the ESS are a relatively coherent and affluent set of countries at the world 621 
stage. It can be assumed that differences in effects could be even greater when a more 622 
geographically, economically and culturally diverse set of countries is sampled and compared 623 
(Lee et al., 2015). Future research should attempt to expand the number of countries to improve 624 
the estimates of cross-national effects, and to explore the contextual factors that shape the 625 
differences in individual-level effects. This will be the focus of future analyses. The time and 626 
resources needed to conduct high-quality cross-national social research with valid, culturally 627 
equivalent measures should not be underestimated, and can only be delivered by substantial 628 
research infrastructures, such as the European Social Survey (ESS) or the International Social 629 
Survey Programme (ISSP) (Fitzgerald & Jowell, 2010; Haller, Jowell, & Smith, 2009). These 630 
international collaborations and investments help to improve our understanding of the cultural 631 
dependency of how climate change is perceived, as well as which policies and sustainable 632 
behaviours are considered acceptable.  633 
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Table 1. Mean scores and standard deviations for the four climate change perception variables.  880 
Country Region Sample size 
Trend 
Scepticism (1) 
Attribution 
scepticism(2) 
Perceived impacts of 
climate change(3) 
Concern about 
climate change(4) 
 
 N % % M (SD) M (SD) 
Austria W 2,010 7.3 7.9 -1.75 (2.21) 3.07 (0.90) 
Belgium W 1,766 3.6 5.9 -1.64 (2.34) 3.17 (0.86) 
Czech Republic CE 2,269 10.7 9.9 -1.57 (1.98) 2.77 (1.05) 
Estonia CE 2,019 8.6 10.8 -1.40 (2.07) 2.65 (0.95) 
Finland N 1,925 5.9 6.0 -1.49 (2.00) 3.05 (0.82) 
France W 2,070 3.7 6.1 -1.99 (2.21) 3.21 (0.93) 
Germany W 2,852 4.5 5.1 -2.04 (1.93) 3.36 (0.85) 
Hungary CE 1,614 8.2 6.9 -2.26 (2.06) 3.05 (0.85) 
Iceland N 880 2.3 5.3 -2.28 (1.96) 3.13 (0.92) 
Ireland W 2,757 3.8 8.4 -1.46 (2.37) 2.83 (0.92) 
Israel - 2,557 12.0 11.7 -1.07 (2.65) 2.64 (1.05) 
Italy S 2,626 5.0 6.1 -1.74 (2.34) 3.21 (0.84) 
Lithuania CE 2,122 11.0 15.4 -1.69 (2.04) 2.82 (0.91) 
Netherlands W 1,681 3.7 8.0 -1.13 (2.07) 3.01 (0.86) 
Norway N 1,545 7.1 12.0 -1.64 (1.97) 3.00 (0.83) 
Poland CE 1,694 7.1 9.7 -1.68 (2.06) 2.75 (0.86) 
Portugal S 1,270 3.0 6.2 -2.55 (2.32) 3.48 (0.92) 
Russian Federation CE 2,430 16.5 12.7 -1.42 (2.16) 2.75 (0.97) 
Slovenia CE 1,307 3.5 6.9 -1.69 (2.30) 3.17 (0.86) 
Spain S 1,958 4.1 4.0 -2.90 (2.00) 3.42 (0.88) 
Sweden N 1,551 3.2 7.5 -2.11 (1.93) 2.86 (0.87) 
Switzerland W 1,525 3.5 5.4 -1.80 (2.10) 3.12 (0.85) 
United Kingdom W 1,959 6.4 8.8 -1.46 (2.24) 2.96 (0.94) 
31 
 
Note: Post-stratification weights have been applied for country-level analysis; W = Western Europe; N = Northern Europe; CE = Central and 881 
Eastern Europe; S = Southern Europe (1) Coding: 0 probably/definitely changing, 1 probably/definitely not changing; (2) coding: 0 entirely/mainly 882 
by human activity/about equally by natural processes and human activity, 1 entirely/mainly by natural processes; (3) coding: scale from -5 extremely 883 
bad to +5 extremely good; (4) coding: scale from 1 not at all worried to 5 extremely worried.  884 
32 
 
Table 2. Associations of socio-political and demographic factors with the four climate change perception variables (Model 1). 885 
 
Trend Scepticism Attribution scepticism 
Perceived impacts of 
climate change 
Concern about climate 
change 
 OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI) B (95% CI) B (95% CI) 
Self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) 0.78 (0.74 to 0.82) *** 0.79 (0.75 to 0.83)*** -0.25 (-0.27 to -0.22)*** 0.11 (0.10 to 0.12)*** 
Conservation (vs. openness-to-change) 0.97 (0.92 to 1.01)n.s. 0.99 (0.95 to 1.03)n.s. 0.05 (0.02 to 0.07)*** -0.03 (-0.04 to -0.02)*** 
Political orientation: right (vs. left) 1.11 (1.06 to 1.16)*** 1.18 (1.14 to 1.23)*** 0.22 (0.19 to 0.24)*** -0.08 (-0.09 to -0.07)*** 
Gender: male (vs female) 1.37 (1.26 to 1.49)*** 1.31 (1.22 to 1.42)*** -0.09 (-0.13 to -0.040)*** -0.09 (-0.10 to -0.07)*** 
Age 1.06 (1.03 to 1.08)*** 1.12 (1.10 to 1.15)*** 0.11 (0.09 to 0.12)*** -0.03 (-0.04 to -0.02)*** 
Level of education 0.91 (0.89 to 0.94)*** 0.91 (0.89 to 0.93)*** -0.12 (-0.13 to -0.11)*** 0.04 (0.04 to 0.05)*** 
Note: *** p < 0.001; n.s. non-significant ; OR = odds ratio; CI = confidence interval. 886 
 887 
Table 3. Cross-country variation in the associations of the socio-political and demographic factors with the four climate change perception variables (Model 2). 888 
 
Trend scepticism Attribution scepticism 
Perceived impacts of climate 
change Concern about climate change 
 σ² (SE) σ² (SE) σ² (SE) σ² (SE) 
Self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) 0.040 (0.020)* 0.016 (0.008)* 0.014 (0.006)* 0.001 (0.001) n.s. 
Conservation (vs. openness-to-change) 0.024 (0.012)* 0.013 (0.006) * 0.024 (0.009)** 0.002 (0.001)* 
Political orientation: right (vs. left) 0.007 (0.004) n.s. 0.017 (0.008)* 0.011 (0.005)* 0.003 (0.001)** 
Gender: male (vs female) 0.021 (0.015) n.s. 0.060 (0.029)* 0.010 (0.006) n.s. 0.008 (0.003)** 
Age 0.007 (0.003) * 0.002 (0.001)*. 0.007 (0.003)* 0.001 (0.001) n.s. 
Level of education 0.004 (0.002)*. 0.004 (0.002)* 0.005 (0.002)* 0.000 (0.000) n.s. 
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; n.s. non-significant. 889 
 890 
 891 
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Table 4. Interactions of European regions with the socio-political and demographic factors for the four climate change perception variables (Model 3a and 3b) 892 
 
Trend scepticism Attribution scepticism 
Perceived impacts of climate 
change Concern about climate change 
 B (95% CI) B (95% CI) B (95% CI) B (95% CI) 
Model 3a (main effects)     
Region     
   Central and Eastern Europe 0.717 (0.235 to 1.179)** 0.446 (0.062 to 0.830)* -0.126 (-0.444 to 0.192) n.s. -0.165 (-0.357 to 0.027) n.s. 
   Southern Europe -0.282 (-0.933 to 0.369) n.s. -0.341 (-0.890 to 0.208) n.s. -0.870 (-1.301 to -0.439)*** 0.348 (0.117 to 0.579)** 
   Northern Europe 0.067 (-0.527 to 0.661) n.s. 0.143 (-0.384 to 0.670) n.s. -0.115 (-0.515 to 0.285) n.s. -0.152 (-0.338 to 0.034) n.s. 
     
Model 3b (interactions)     
Self-transcendence (vs. self-enhancement) -0.284 (-0.372 to -0.196)*** -0.281 (-0.354 to -0.208)*** -0.301 (-0.338 to -0.264)*** 0.114 (0.098 to 0.130)*** 
   Central and Eastern Europe 0.063 (-0.055 to 0.181) n.s. 0.097 (0.009 to 0.185)* 0.098 (0.035 to 0.161)** -0.025 (-0.049 to -0.001)* 
   Southern Europe -0.135 (-0.341 to 0.071) n.s. 0.041 (-0.131 to 0.213) n.s. -0.059 (-0.141 to 0.023) n.s. 0.029 (0.004 to 0.062) n.s. 
   Northern Europe 0.183 (0.020 to 0.346)* 0.101 (-0.030 to 0.232) n.s. 0.194 (0.121 to 0.267)*** -0.027 (-0.056 to 0.002) n.s. 
     
Conservation (vs. openness-to-change) -0.034 (-0.017 to 0.085) n.s -0.037 (-0.082 to 0.008) n.s -0.011 (-0.046 to 0.024) n.s -0.031 (-0.05 to -0.017)*** 
   Central and Eastern Europe -0.089 (-0.193 to 0.015) n.s. 0.036 (-0.058 to 0.130) n.s. -0.167 (-0.224 to -0.110)*** 0.023 (-0.001 to 0.047) n.s. 
   Southern Europe -0.131 (-0.309 to 0.047) n.s. 0.197 (0.044 to 0.350)* -0.153 (-0.224 to -0.082)*** -0.012 (-0.041 to 0.017) n.s. 
   Northern Europe 0.210 (0.059 to 0.361)** 0.193 (0.070 to 0.316)** 0.146 (0.079 to 0.213)*** -0.003 (-0.030 to 0.024) n.s. 
     
Political orientation: right (vs. left) 0.204 (0.120 to 0.288)*** 0.183 (0.110 to 0.256)*** 0.266 (0.229 to 0.303)*** -0.099 (-0.11 to -0.08)*** 
   Central and Eastern Europe -0.191 (-0.297 to -0.085)** -0.125 (-0.223 to -0.027)* -0.132 (-0.189 to -0.075)*** 0.067 (0.043 to 0.091)*** 
   Southern Europe -0.068 (-0.237 to 0.101) n.s. -0.040 (-0.183 to 0.103) n.s. -0.150 (-0.221 to -0.079)*** 0.052 (0.025 to 0.079)*** 
   Northern Europe -0.085 (-0.242 to 0.072) n.s. 0.152 (0.023 to 0.281)* 0.029 (-0.038 to 0.096) n.s. -0.024 (-0.051 to 0.003) n.s. 
     
Gender: male (vs female) 0.360 (0.201 to 0.519)*** 0.304 (0.173 to 0.435)*** -0.126 (-0.193 to -0.059)*** -0.030 (-0.06 to 0.00) n.s 
   Central and Eastern Europe -0.083 (-0.287 to 0.121) n.s. -0.031 (-0.209 to 0.147) n.s. 0.099 (0.001 to 0.197)* -0.104 (-0.149 to -0.059)*** 
34 
 
   Southern Europe -0.246 (-0.611 to 0.119) n.s. -0.182 (-0.472 to 0.108) n.s. -0.024 (-0.165 to 0.117) n.s. 0.028 (-0.031 to 0.087) n.s. 
   Northern Europe 0.136 (-0.168 to 0.440) n.s. 0.297 (0.054 to 0.540)* 0.052 (-0.073 to 0.177) n.s. -0.183 (-0.238 to -0.128)*** 
     
Age 0.097 (0.056 to 0.138)*** 0.149 (0.112 to 0.186)*** 0.112 (0.092 to 0.132)*** -0.031 (-0.04 to -0.02)*** 
   Central and Eastern Europe -0.076 (-0.131 to -0.021)** -0.078 (-0.129 to -0.027)** -0.070 (-0.099 to -0.041)*** 0.017 (0.003 to 0.031)* 
   Southern Europe -0.027 (-0.121 to 0.067) n.s 0.025 (-0.059 to 0.109) n.s. -0.046 (-0.085 to -0.007)* 0.008 (-0.008 to 0.024) n.s. 
   Northern Europe 0.008 (-0.068 to 0.084) n.s 0.014 (-0.049 to 0.077) n.s. 0.129 (0.094 to 0.164)*** -0.021 (-0.035 to -0.007)** 
     
Level of education -0.102 (-0.145 to -0.059)*** -0.127 (-0.162 to -0.092)*** -0.150 (-0.168 to -0.132)*** 0.052 (0.040 to 0.060) 
   Central and Eastern Europe 0.055 (-0.004 to 0.114) n.s 0.090 (0.037 to 0.143)*** 0.098 (0.067 to 0.129)*** -0.013 (-0.015 to 0.012) n.s. 
   Southern Europe 0.077 (-0.013 to 0.167) n.s -0.066 (-0.152 to 0.020) n.s. 0.096 (0.061 to 0.131)*** -0.008 (-0.024 to 0.008) n.s. 
   Northern Europe -0.100 (-0.180 to -0.020)* 0.006 (-0.061 to 0.073) n.s. -0.056 (-0.091 to -0.021)** -0.002 (-0.018 to 0.014) n.s. 
Note: Western Europe is the reference region;*** p < 0.001; n.s. non-significant ; CI = confidence interval; The odds ratios for trend and attribution scepticism can be calculated by EXP (B). 893 
  894 
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Figure 1. Associations of (1) self-transcendence versus self-enhancement, (2) conservation versus openness-to-change, and (3) political orientation, with (a) trend scepticism, (b) attribution 895 
scepticism, (c) perceived impacts of climate change, and (d) concern about climate change in 18 European countries 896 
 897 
898 
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Figure 2. Associations of (1) gender, (2) age, and (3) level of education, with (a) trend scepticism, (b) attribution scepticism, (c) 899 
perceived impacts of climate change, and (d) concern about climate change in 18 European countries 900 
 901 
